Abstract-This paper studies the problem of jammingresistant spectrum aggregation and access (SAA) for energyefficiency (EE) cognitive radio communications. We consider various jamming behaviors, where jammers may attack all available channels with arbitrarily changing strategies over time, attack a subset of the channels at certain time slots, or have different intelligence, i.e., oblivious or adaptive adversary, and so on. Without any priori knowledge about the channels and jammers, it is very challenging to design an efficient and practical jamming-resistant SAA algorithm to reach the optimal EE goal. In this paper, we utilize the advanced martingale concentration inequalities in an multi-armed bandits-based online learning framework to facilitate the optimal detection of various jamming behaviors. We first define a novel EE model for discontiguous orthogonal frequency division multiplexing to facilitate scalable SAA over distributed spectrum pools in practice. Then, the jamming-resistant dynamic channel access problem is formulated as a regret minimization problem. Meanwhile, an online stochastic gradient descent with bandit feedback procedure is adopted to allocate the transmit power. The proposed algorithm can autonomously detect the environmental features and find a near-optimal solution in each attacking scenario. Our algorithm is implemented with low complexity and with multiple users under some practical jamming scenarios. Extensive numerical studies show that under some practical jamming scenarios, our algorithm has an EE improvement of 45.3% over a fixed learning period, and an improvement of 82.5% in terms of learning duration compared with existing approaches. Index Terms-Jamming, spectrum aggregation and access, energy efficiency, cognitive radio and multi-armed bandits.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE (Dis-) contiguous spectrum aggregation (SA) and access (SAA) in cognitive radios (CRs) by aggregating spectrum fragments over a spectrum pool facilitate wideband applications in support for wireless communications. In the future CR cellular systems, the aggregated spectral chunks 1 could also be interleaved with other incumbent primary users (PUs), and thus the SAA is one of the key technologies for the Long-Term-Evolution Advanced (LTE-A) standard in the fifth generation (5G) systems [1] . The main idea is to select some (dis-) contiguous channels and then to access (allocate transmit power) the spectrum holes based on the spectrum sensing result over the primary user activities (PUAs).
Furthermore, CR design gets more challenging with security considerations, where SUs are extremely vulnerable to denialof-service jamming attacks [2] . Malicious cognitive jammers with sensing capabilities can jam the available channels for SUs without affecting the activities of PUs. In a nutshell, the states and accessibility of SUs' accessible channels could be stochastic, contaminated or adversarial at different temporal and spectral locations; further more, jammers with cognitive radio functionalities could be intelligent enough to fight against the defending algorithm based on their previous observations (i.e., adaptive jammer). Xiao et al. [3] considered the jamming game between a SU and a CR enabled jammer. Assuming the uncertainty decision maker of jammers, a prospect theory (PT) based approach is used to formulate the interactions between a SU and a smart jamming as a dynamic jamming game regarding their respective choices of transmit power. They studied the Nash equilibria of the games under various channel models and transmission costs. Especially, a closed-form solution is obtained for a jamming according to a Markov decision process with uncertainty on channel variation. By contrast, the learning approach does not need such restriction. In [4] and [5] , a stochastic game is played by CR networks that integrates anti-jamming and jamming subgames into a stochastic framework, where the Q-learning technique is used to solve for an optimal channel access strategy. While the Q-learning is a typical reinforcement learning technique that ensures the optimal anti-jamming only asymptotically, the multi-armed bandit (MAB)-based online learning framework is capable to guarantee the optimal anti-jamming performance given any finite time-slots of observations.
The application of the MAB framework for CR communications under adversarial attacks have attracted timely and intensive attentions [6] - [9] . A SU could encounter the dilemma of whether to use the current aggregated set of channels (called exploitation) or to continue performing SAA for some other strategies (called exploration) according to its past collected information. This exploitation and exploration tradeoff could theoretically be formulated as the MAB problem [10] , which can roughly be categorized into two major types, i.e., stochastic MAB [11] and adversarial MAB [12] . Existing works, such as [13] - [15] , have applied stochastic MAB with the famous UCB algorithm [16] for CR sensing and channel access problems with unknown independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) channel statistics under only PUA, while other works, such as [6] and [8] , have applied adversarial MAB with the famous EXP3 algorithm [12] for anti-jamming CR communications with arbitrary (non-i.i.d.) attacking strategies. Amuru et al. [17] studied the maximization of the jamming effect for a cognitive jammer that adaptively and optimally disrupts the legal communication links. A MAB algorithm based on UCB1 [16] for discrete jamming strategy selection is proposed along with the continuum MAB algorithm [18] for continuous jamming power selection. It is proved that the learning is fast than reinforcement learning algorithms. However, all these works have the intention to maximize the accumulated channel rewards with constant power profiles, and the performance is qualified by the term "regret", i.e., the difference of the accumulated reward between the proposed learning algorithm and the optimal fixed strategy. Furthermore, to our best knowledge, no existing work has considered the use of the MAB framework to improve the energy efficiency (EE) (which is also the central theme in LTE-A) under jamming attacks.
To our best knowledge, there is no stochastic MAB algorithm that can fit adversarial MAB problems; on the other hand, the adversarial MAB algorithms are unable to exploit the simple regime of stochastic MABs. Empirical simulations in [19] have shown that EXP3 is inferior to all other known algorithms in the stochastic regime, including the simplest UCB [16] . As such, the simple assumption of either stochastic or adversarial wireless environments where the respective MAB models are applied as a bit oversimplified in existing works. Since the nature of wireless security environments is hard to be pre-determined, an inadequate use of existing algorithms would attain a bad performance. For example, in [6] and [8] , applying EXP3 to where only a subset of channels are jammed would lead to large regrets. On the other hand, applying UCB [16] and its variants (e.g., [20] ) under arbitrarily varying jamming and the resulted channel states is infeasible in wireless security environments, since the i.i.d.-ness assumption is violated in the jamming scenario. Note that the EXP4 algorithm in [12] could be used to take the power allocation as side observations, but the EXP4 is not suitable for combinatorial problems [21] and the power profile can hardly be determined in the anti-jamming setting. In summary, an adaptive and unified MAB model applicable in both stochastic and adversary environments is highly desirable, especially for the cases without a priori information on jammer and PUA.
In this paper, we investigate a near-optimal learning algorithm for EE CR communications where the SU performs a joint aggregating, sensing, probing, and accessing (ASPA) scheme for anti-jamming communications. The SU, equipped with the discontiguous orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (DOFDM) [22] , could access several spectrum fragments simultaneously. Our proposed algorithm is based on the famous EXP3 [12] algorithm, and we extend it to the combinatorial version for the multiple-channel selection setting. More importantly, we introduce a novel exploration parameter for each channel and then advanced martingale concentration inequalities [23] are applied in our devised algorithm to detect jamming behaviors and select the optimal un-jammed or the least jammed channels to access. By joint control over the exploration probability and the learning rate, the proposed algorithm achieves near optimal learning performance in different wireless security regimes by selecting optimal set of channels to access. Meanwhile, an online adaptive power allocation procedure on each selected channel is put in parallel with the MAB algorithm at every round to maximize the EE over time. Our algorithm, like most other MAB algorithms, runs in an adaptive way, without making any hard assumptions on the wireless security environments. In other words, the algorithm does not restrict the jamming behaviors, i.e., the distribution or statistical model. Hence, the proposed algorithm can be widely applied in many practical jamming scenarios, while others could not. As for our proposed algorithm, when the environment happens to be in the full adversarial regime, it enjoys the same optimal regret bound "root-t" as the classic adversarial MAB algorithms. When the environment happens to be in the stochastic regime without jamming, we establish a problem-dependent "polylogarithmic-t" regret bound, which is slightly worse than the optimal "logarithmic-t" bound in [11] . Furthermore, our proposed algorithm retains the "polylogarithmic-t" regret bound in the stochastic regime, when the contamination caused by jamming is less than a half over time in the average sense.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows. 1) We categorize the wireless security environments into three typical regimes. We show that the proposed algorithm neither needs to distinguish the type of PUs and jamming behaviors, nor to know the channel accessibility or quality in all the regimes. We prove that our algorithm could achieve the near optimal regret performance, which provides an efficient solution for practical jamming-resistant SA in EE CR communications. 2) We adopt the online stochastic gradient descent (OSGD) with two-point bandit feedback [10] approach to update the transmit power towards the optimal values. The procedure to obtain the estimated gradient does not require the concrete EE objective function, which is especially applicable under the target security settings. 3) We conduct extensive real experiments. Numerical results demonstrate that our algorithm is very efficient in practice and can achieve substantial performance improvements compared to classic approaches. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is presented. In Section III, the proposed algorithm is introduced. In Section IV, the performance results are developed in different regimes. Numerical results are given in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
This section introduces the EE CR communication model in the present of jamming attack. We have one SU coexists with multiple PUs in a primary network. The entire set of available orthogonal channels is denoted by K = {1, 2, . . . , K } for some K > 0. For a channel f ∈ K, its bandwidth is given by B( f ). The SU adopts the energy detection method [24] for spectrum sensing. When a channel is occupied by a PU, it is called busy; otherwise, it is called idle.
Specifically, the SU operates in terms of rounds. For each round, the SU starts with spending time t s for channel sensing, and then t p for channel probing to do quick estimates of channel quality [8] . As noticed, a typical value of t s is about 10 ms for a single channel and t p is from 10 ms to 133 ms [25] . Let t sp = t s + t p . If the channel is busy, the SU skips the transmission if the channel is idle, the SU transmits data with probability for a duration t a . It is guaranteed that t sp + t a is no longer than the minimal idle time among all channels occupied by the PUs. Here, we introduce the probability for multiple purposes, which will be discussed later. Each round may end up with either channel probing (if the channel quality is bad due to jamming or sensed to be wrong) or data transmission. At the end of each round, the SU receiver calculates the EE in the current round, updates the transmission strategy for the next round, and feeds back this information to the transmitter via the control channel. The computational time of updating the transmission strategy is usually in the range of 10 μs to 400 μs, which is neglected here.
The transmission strategy includes an SA strategy and the corresponding power allocation, where the SA strategy is a subset of K, denoted by S ⊆ K. W.L.O.G., the cardinality of S is fixed such that |S| = k ≤ K , although k could be changing due to PUAs at each round. Given practical system considerations, the parameter k could thus be regarded as the maximal size of channels the CR device could access for the hardware limitations of transceivers. Moreover, we use N to denote the whole set of all SA strategies, i.e., N {S :
Then, we use index I t ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} to indicate the chosen SA strategy at round t, where the probability of choosing SA strategy S i is denoted by t (I t = i ) = t (i ). Then, the probability distribution of I t is denoted by t =
Since the index I t stands for a set of channels, we also use t (S i ) = t (i ) in the following sections for convenience. It is worth pointing out that t is the key design variable to optimize such that the SU could achieve the maximum energy efficiency. Note that the notations i and S i have the same meaning within our notations; we will use them interchangeably for the convenience of presentations.
The stochastic power allocation over the transmission time t a is denoted by P t ( f ). Given some SA strategy I t = i , the corresponding power allocation is denoted by
Moreover, we consider the following constraints on P t ( f ).
• The total transmit power constraint:
(1)
• Per-channel power constraint:
Here, we assume that the value of P t ( f ) is chosen from a set, denoted by P f , which could be a continuous (infinite) or discrete (finite) power strategy set. When we have adversary jamming, under the allocated power, the transmission rate for each channel is only revealed at the end of each operation round. As an example, over a slow fading channel with Gaussian noise, we could use the Shannon formula to express the data rate r t ( f ) at round t and channel f , i.e.,
where SINR(P t ( f )) is the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio at the receiver side with transmit power P t ( f ). Particularly, SINR(P t ( f )) could be further written as
, where h t ( f ) is the channel power gain and σ 2 ( f ) is the additive noise power density over the channel f , respectively; J t ( f ) and t ( f ) are the interfering power and the channel power gain from the jammer, respectively. In our considered system, the statistics of the jammer and the channels are unknown to the SU. Therefore, the SU could only learn the behavior of PUs and SINR(P t ( f )) from the history to optimize its transmission strategy.
Let P c t ( f ) denote the transmitter processing power overhead at round t over the channel f , which includes all the power consumption other than that of the transmission. For simplicity, we assume that P c t ( f ) is proportional to the bandwidth of the channel. Then, we have P
Denote the total power consumption at the SU as P
We first define the EE of each channel f as
Note that for the DOFDM-based SA strategy search over a large spectrum pool, the selected SA strategy changes at every round and the strategy S i is most likely to contain a group of nonconsecutive channels in the antijamming setting. Obviously, the size of SA strategies is K k , which is quite large with respect to k. In order to facilitate the DOFDM-based jamming-resistant energyefficient CR communication, we adopt an arithmetic average EE metric [26] , [27] as
B. Problem Formulation: Multi-Armed Bandit
Finding the transmission policy, including the SA strategy and the corresponding power allocation, is a sequential decision process over time, which could be modeled as an MAB problem since the SU needs to deal with the tradeoff between exploitation and exploration.
Next, we introduce some notations commonly used in machine learning to formulate the MAB problem. To begin with, we need to set the upper bound of
Then, we define the reward that the SU could obtain over channel f at the end of round t as g t (
In this way, g t (P t ( f )) is a normalized reward such that 0 ≤ g t (P t ( f )) ≤ 1. Suppose that at round t, the chosen SA strategy is I t ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} with distribution t , the reward could be written as g t (S I t ) = g t (I t ) = f ∈S I t g t (P t ( f )). We focus on a finite time horizon of n rounds, and the total time is nt sp + t a n t =1 1 t ( ), where 1 t ( ) is an random indicator variable with probability . We use T to denote the average total time. Clearly, there is T = nt sp + nt a . For any fixed SA strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |, the total reward up to round n is given by G n (i ) = n t =1 g t (i ). Then, we define the maximum total expected reward and its corresponding single best solution as
Note that the optimal solution i * (not necessarily unique) can be obtained only when the SU knows all the statistics of the channels and jammers, which is only known in hindsight. In contrast, the I t for S I t is determined online by the proposed algorithm at the current round t. Given no knowledge about these statistics, the SU only knows the reward at the end of each round. Since the reward also depends on the power allocation P t (I t ), we define the overall policy as = { t , P t (I t )} 1≤t ≤n . Then, we aim to find a policy that could achieve a total reward as close as possible to G max .
We define the actual total reward up to round n under the policy as
, where I t is determined by t at each round t. We write G n ( ) as a function of for the illustration of performance analysis after we introduce the detailed learning algorithm. To measure the reward difference against (6), we consider the regret R (n), i.e., the difference between G max and the expected actual reward achieved by the proposed learning algorithm of , i.e.,
Note that the regret (7) is contributed by the policy = { t , P t (I t )} 1≤t ≤n , where the reward of each channel reward also depends on the power allocation besides the channel selection strategy.
In addition, to obtain the form of the exponential weighting factor of each channel, we also need a loss model [10] by
. Therefore, the regret R (n) could be equivalently written as
Our goal is to minimize the regret in (8) by designing the policy
The above definition of regret is usually named as the pseudo regret [10] , which is upper bounded by the expected regret
Only when the jammer is oblivious, who prepares the entire sequence of loss functions t (I t ) (t = 1, 2, 3, . . .) in advance, pseudo regret (8) coincides with the standard expected regret E{R (n)} [10] . Note that in (8) the choice of the loss function at round t for the oblivious jammer (as described in Section IV) is independent to the first t − 1 rounds.
Otherwise, the jammer can be called an adaptive adversary (as described in Section IV). In this case, let us denote the SU's entire sequence of strategies up to current round t as (I 1 , . . . , I t ), which we abbreviate by I 1,...,t . The expected cumulative loss suffered by the SU after n rounds is E[ n t =1 t (I 1,...,t )]. We need to compare it with a competitor class C n , which is simply a set of deterministic strategy sequences of length n. Intuitively, we would like to compare the SU's loss with the cumulative loss of the best action sequence in C n . In practice, the most common way to evaluate the SU's performance is to measure its external pseudo-regret compared to C n [12] . Thus, the regret for adaptive adversary is defined as,
This regret definition is suitable for most of the theoretical works of the online learning and bandit setting. If the jammer is oblivious, we have t (I 1,...,t ) equals to t (I t ). With this simplified notation, the regret in (9) becomes the the SU's policy regret in [28] as
which is exactly the same as (8) with C n = S i , if we take an expectation over all the SA strategy sequence (y 1 , . . . , y n ).
In the following, we will first present our algorithm that performs a joint aggregating, sensing, probing, and accessing (ASPA) scheme, which may guarantee the upper bound of R (n) andR (n) on a scale of o(n).
III. THE -ASPA ALGORITHM
To minimize the regret in (8) (or regret in (9) for adaptive jammers), we propose an -ASPA scheme based on the classic EXP3 (stands for "exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation") algorithm [12] . The basic structure of the algorithm is described as below.
• Input the known parameter: The number of orthogonal channels K , and the number of rounds running the algorithm n.
• For each round t = 1, 2, . . . , n, do 1) Choose an SA strategy I t ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} according to the probability distribution t . 2) Sense and probe the channels as in [8] for each channel. 3) Access each channel f ∈ S I t with probability . 4) Transmit over the accessed channels according to power allocation P t (I t ). 5) Compute p t +1 , and
Note that the current SA strategy probability distribution t could be conveyed to the SU sender through a common control channel (CCC) from the SU receiver. It is worth noting that the access probability in step 3) is set to actively avoid the unexpected jamming attack and the sensing error. Thus, it is viewed as an index term for the feedback information loss due to the CCC has been jammed. In addition, the parameter also affects the overall expected EE.
Before we discuss how to update p t and P t ( f ), it is necessary to introduce the components used in our algorithm. The two key controlling variables are the learning rates {η t } and the exploration probabilities {γ t }, which are non-increasing sequences in order to bound the regret [10] . Similar to EXP3, we set the parameter
, where
Here, the new parameter ξ t ( f ) is introduced such that the exploration for each channel can be tuned individually based on the past observations. The detailed design of η t and ξ t ( f ) is discussed for each particular wireless security environment in the next section. Then, by setting w 1 ( f ) = 1, the weighting factor of channel f at round t ≥ 2 is iteratively defined as
In equation (11), we use the exponential gradient in [12] to update the weighting factor w t ( f ) with the learning rate η t and current round loss value˜ t (P t ( f )). Furthermore, for
is the weighting factor for the SA strategy S i . Here,
The equation (13) is used to get the unbiased estimation of˜ t ( f ) similar to EXP3 [12] . We set the ρ t ( f ) as the probability of channel f being selected according to distribution t by mapping the probabilities t (S i ) of all SA strategies that share the channel f , i.e.,
where A f means that A contains f . Denote the probability profile over all channels as
In addition, we introduce a subset C ⊆ N used for updating t , and call it the covering strategy set. Specifically, C is a set with a minimum number of SA strategies such that every channel in K is included by some strategy in C. For example, if K = {1, 2, . . . , 6} and the SU is able to sense k = 2 channels, a covering set could be C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}}. Then, we have |C| = K k . Clearly, C is not unique. In this way, we could ensure that each channel is explored sufficiently often. Now, we are ready to show how to update t and P t ( f ).
A. Channel Strategy Selection Updates p t +1
For each component
where
The notation W t denotes the summation of the weighting factors of all the SA strategies S j , ∀ j ∈ N . In (14) , the term
is the original portion of weights over the total weight W t contributed by the SA strategy S i in the adversarial MAB setting. The term (1− f ∈K ε t ( f )) controls the probability for the exploitation, which means the selection of S i stays with
given this probability. By contrast, the term f ∈S i ε t ( f ) stands for the probability for the exploration if the SA strategy S i falls into the covering strategy set C. That means we need to explore novel SA strategy for the try of next round. Otherwise, if the SA strategy S i is not in the covering strategy set C, we only need to perform the exploitation with probability Then, ρ t can be further instantiated as {ρ t ( f ), f ∈ K}, where
In (15), the terms with factors
f }| stand for directly mapping of all the SA strategies that share the channel f from (14) . For example, if the overall SA strategies are 
B. Power Strategy Updates
We update the power allocation based on the online stochastic gradient descent (OSGD) approach [10] .
First, we introduce a random variable S with a uniform distribution on a small set P f ⊂ P f . Then, let x S be the offset that is used to estimate the gradient, where x > 0 guarantees that x S ∈ P f . Thus, we could obtain
We employ the two power values P + t ( f ) and P − t ( f ) to estimate the respective rewards in the probing phase if the channel f has been selected in round t.
For any quasi-convex loss˜ t ( f ) in (13), the two-point gradient estimate is defined by
From (17), we see that the˜ t (P + t ( f )) and the˜ t (P − t ( f )) are the estimated rewards (converted to losses) under the respective power P (17) is explicitly to use a difference method to estimate the gradient.
Then, we perform OSGD based on the estimated gradient to predict the power allocation P t +1 ( f ) as (18) where c is some constant and will be specified later. The term
is a standard gradient descent procedure to update the power from P t ( f ) to P t +1 ( f ). The projection of y ∈ P f back to the set P f is to ensure a valid power value for P t +1 ( f ).
Algorithm 1 -ASPA: A Spectrum Aggregation Scheme for Jamming-Resistant Energy-Efficient CR Communications
Input parameters K , n, .
Calculate p 1 according to (14) and set P 1 ( f ) = 0 for all f ∈ K. for t = 1, 2, . . . , n do 1: Choose a SA strategy S I t ∈ N according to the probability distribution p t . 2: Sense and probe the channels in S I t . 3: Access the idle channels with probability ; 4: Transmit with power allocation P t ( f ); 5: Calculate t ( f ) and update p t +1 according to (11)- (15) and P t ( f ) according to (16)- (18) . end for Finally, we summarize the algorithm -ASPA in Algorithm 1. The channel strategy selection update and power strategy update by OSGD are two parallel procedures that sharing the single optimization objective of the EE (4) within the MAB framework. From the line 3, if a channel f is selected, a reward is obtained. Afterward, the power strategy update procedure could update the power P t ( f ) of this channel in line 5. Then in the remaining learning duration, if this channel f has been selected again, it will use the updated power P t ( f ) in line 5 from the previous round. As such, the EE of this channel could be pushed to the optimal value over time.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF EECC UNDER -ASPA IN DIFFERENT WIRELESS SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS
This section analyzes the regret performance of our proposed -ASPA algorithm in three different wireless security environments as shown in Fig. 1, named full adversarial , stochastic, and contaminated stochastic. The approaches of the regret analysis for these regimes are quite different, although our algorithm does not need to distinguish and know these regimes before the run. We provide both the upper bound of the regret and the guaranteed least expected EE of the -ASPA scheme. The results demonstrate that -ASPA is a powerful algorithm that could achieve near optimal performance automatically in all the considered regimes.
It is assumed that the jammer is only interested in attacking the CR communication; otherwise, it risks itself being detected by PUs [5] . Also, the jammer knows the whole spectrum pool K, and could sense the idle channels of PUs to jam and to prevent the spectrum being efficiently utilized by the legitimate SUs. It is assumed that the jammer is equipped with similar radio capabilities to those in the SU, while the jamming strategy is regulated to some fixed pattern. In the case of random jamming, jammers could sense and attack on a subset of k j channels over K. A jamming strategy is denoted as
Noticing that the learning rate η t is sufficient to control the regret of the -ASPA in the full adversarial regime, regardless of the choice of the exploration parameter ξ t ( f ). On the other hand, ξ t ( f ) is sufficient to control the regret in the stochastic regimes as long as η t ≥ β t . To facilitate the -ASPA algorithm without knowing about the nature of the environments, we can adjust the two control parameters simultaneously by setting η t = β t , and use the control parameter ξ t ( f ) in the stochastic regimes such that it can achieve the optimal "root-t" regret in the full adversarial regime and near optimal "logarithmic-t" regret in the stochastic regime.
Before the presentation of final results, the following subsection is an important component for the analysis the regret performance of the -ASPA in different regimes.
A. Online Stochastic Power Allocation
This subsection studies the performance of online stochastic power allocation for the power strategy update procedure in Section III.B for each channel over time, which tries to push the EE towards the optimal value. When considering the information theoretical capacity, the maximization of EE (5) for one round is quasi-concave with respect to P t ( f ) with relaxation of constraint (1) and (2) as analyzed in [29] , where the water-filling method can be used to solve the problem. In our analysis, we do not specify any concrete objective functions for˜ t (P t ( f )) but only assumes that˜ t (P t ( f )) is quasi-concave with respect to P t ( f ). This is a reasonable assumption, since the allocated power would make˜ t (P t ( f )) be saturated at some point when the power goes large. We define the following pseudo-regret on each channel f : (19) where we denote min y∈P f = P * t ( f ). The bandit constraint can be simply interpreted as the impossibility of computing gradients. In other words, we do not have explicit representation of the function, but it can be accessed by querying values at desired points. In our work, we choose the twopoint model that achieves a O( √ n) upper bound on the pseudo-regret. The performance of OSGD with two-point feedback was thoroughly investigated in [10, Sec. 6.1], which we put here for completeness. Theorem (Regret of OSGD With Two-Point Feedback [10] ): Let S ⊆ P f ⊆ R, and P f is a closed convex set for each f ∈ S i such that r S ⊆ P f ⊆ RS for some r , R ≥ 0. For t ≥ 1 and
and convex losses. Fix x > 0 and assume OSGD is run on (1 − x r )P f with learning rate η > 0 and gradient estimates in equation (17) ,
where S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n are independent and uniformly distributed over S. For each t = 1, 2, . . . , n, letP t ( f ) be drawn at random between P
, when x → 0, we have that
Remark 1: This theorem implies that if˜ t (P t ( f )) is G-Lipschitz differentiable, equivalent to G-Lipschitz continuous for continuous and differential functions, we have vanishing normalized regret in (19) (R f (n) n
approaching "zero" when n goes large) to approach the optimal power allocation strategy for each channel f . As an example, this condition easily holds under the Shannon capacity (3) given that the channel power gain h t ( f ) is finite, where the corresponding G equals to the upper bound of B( f )
according to (20) . Note that the performance of the regret for the online stochastic power allocation only depends on the G-Lipschitz constant and the closed convex set constant R. The OSGD with two-point feedback is applicable for any continuous (infinite) and convex power strategy set [10] .
The procedure always pushes the power allocation strategy chosen from P f towards its optimal strategies to maximize the EE in (4), and the updating procedure for the next round is stochastic and independent to time. Thus, the value of t (P t ( f )) is also stochastic over time, and the distributions of the loss functions are still i.i.d. without jamming. If the adversarial jamming attack is imposed on f , this only affects the regret of the bandit problem but not theR f (n). This is because, conceptually, OSGD is only conducted on a data sequence of values of EE for each single channel with a uniformly perturbed set S that is independent of the other channels, which implicitly assumes arbitrary types of the input data sequence over it (i.i.d. or non-i.i.d. channel rewards). Furthermore, the anytime learning rate η = R G √ t , which has the same order of O(
) as the learning rate η t for the exponentially weighted update of in the -ASPA. In the OSGD procedure, the learning rate is cη t , and the constant is c = R G 4K ln K .
B. Full Adversarial Regime
When the jammer is able to sense and attack all K channels such that the transceiver's channel rewards are completely suffered by the jammer with arbitrarily changing attacking strength all the time (See Fig. 1 (a) ), all statistical information of channels in the spectrum pool are evolved adversarially, and we name this regime as the full adversarial regime.
Accordingly, the transmit rates will be significantly reduced and thus lead to large EE reduction. The SU receiver will suggest a SA strategy S i with the least suffered subset of channels based on collected history information. Here, our problem is extended from the classic non-stochastic MAB problem [12] to the "top k" [21] combinatorial MAB problem. The dynamics of the adversarial regime is much harder to predict and learn than other regimes under the same learning algorithm. Thus, the performance in the adversarial regime achieves the worst regret.
Different attack philosophies will lead to different level of effectiveness. We focus on the following two type of jammers in the adversarial regime.
1) Oblivious Jammer: An oblivious jammer senses and attacks different channels with different attacking strength, which is independent of the past communication records it has observed. As described in [30] , oblivious jammer can use random strategies to attack wireless channels. Moreover, many other kinds of jammers, such as partial band jamming, sweep jamming etc. [31] , are all oblivious jammers. Although their attacking strategies (e.g., targeting channels, jamming strength, etc.) are time independent, 2 they do not react to the defending strategy.
Recall thatĜ n ( ) is the reward achieved by the -ASPA scheme over n rounds. The obtained upper bounds in all three regimes are under the condition = 1. We first show that by tuning η t and ξ t ( f ) together, we can get the optimal regret upper bound of -ASPA in the adversarial regime.
Theorem 1: Under the oblivious jamming attack, no matter how the status of the channels change (potentially in an adversarial manner), for η n = β n , and any ξ n ( f ) ≥ 0, the regret of the -ASPA for any slots number n satisfies:
Due to the space limitation, please refer to our technical report [34] for the proof details. The proof of Theorem 1 borrows some of the analysis of EXP3 with the loss model in [10] . However, the special type of combinatorial MAB problem and the introduction of the new mixing exploration parameter make the proof a non-trivial task.
The upper bound of the regret in Theorem 1 is the same as the result in Theorem 1 for the anti-jamming wireless communications [30] . The upper bound obtained in Theorem 1 can only be tight when all channels are attacked by oblivious jammer in all rounds. On the contrary, the work [30] used the original EXP3 in a scenario where the jamming attacker only occurs at a subset of the channel pool, which would incur performance loss as indicated in [19] . In this scenario, it can not differentiate the attacked and unattacked (stochastically distributed) channels.
According to the -ASPA scheme, the SU will transmit n times in expectation during n rounds. According to system model, it is easy to show
Suppose that t a = αt sp and the constant α 1. Then, we present the guaranteed least expected EE in the following Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of the -ASPA in the adversarial regime under the oblivious jammer is at least
Corollary 1 can be proved by multiplying the term t a T at inequality (23) with some simple algebra. We can find that when T is sufficiently large, the achievable expected EE is at least
, which is maximized when = 1. Obviously, the expected EE that can be achieved is no more than
, because each transmission takes at least t sp + t a time while the expected EE is no more than G max . Thus, when T is sufficiently large, the -ASPA scheme of the -ASPA is near optimal.
2) Adaptive Jammer: An adaptive jammer controls its attacking strength on the targeted (sub)set of channels by utilizing its past experiences and observations. This type of jammer is very powerful. It can infer the proposed defending algorithms and perform the attacking. As shown in a recent work [28] , no bandit algorithm can guarantee a regret o(n) (cannot perform no-regret learning) against an adaptive adversary with unbounded memory, because the adaptive adversary can mimic the behavior of online learning algorithm to attack, which leads to a linear regret (the attack can not be defended). Therefore, we consider a more practical θ -memory-bounded adaptive adversary [28] model, where the loss functions depend only on the θ + 1 most recent strategies.
The following results present the performance results under θ -memory-bounded adaptive jamming attack.
Theorem 2: Under the θ -memory-bounded adaptive jamming attack, for η n = β n and any ξ n ( f ) ≥ 0, the policy regret of the -ASPA for any n is upper bounded by:
Due to the space limitation, please refer to our technical report [34] for the proof details.
To defend against the θ -memory-bounded adaptive jammer, we adopt the idea of the mini-batch protocol proposed in [28] . Since the θ -memory-bounded adaptive jammer infers the loss of the original algorithm A ( -ASPA) with a maximal memory of θ , the modified algorithm A τ ( -ASPA τ ) would wrap consecutive rounds of attacked sequence into a mini-batch of size τ that is larger than θ . In this way, algorithm -ASPA τ generates a new sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , based on which the new defending algorithm could predict a more appropriate loss to defend this intelligent attacker.
Comparing the regret upper bounds in Theorems 1 and 2, it is observed that the policy regret upper bound in Theorem 2 (under adaptive jammer) is O(n 2 3 ) that is worse than that in Theorem 1 (under oblivious jammer) O(n 1 2 ). It implies that the adaptive jammer is much difficult to defend, and the -ASPA algorithm experiences a slower learning rate in the convergence to the optimal defensive strategies. Please note that, in the proof of Theorem 2, we do not require further information except the value of consecutive rounds of losses with size τ ≥ θ .
Corollary 2: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of the -ASPA in the adversarial regime under the θ -memorybounded adaptive jammer can achievê
where T = nt sp + nt a . With sufficiently large T , our -ASPA scheme of -ASPA is near optimal. Corollary 2 shows that the -ASPA under adaptive jammer experiences worst guaranteed expected average EE during the average communication period T .
C. Stochastic Regime
In this regime, there is no jamming attack in the system and the SU just utilizes the spectrum pool K in a stochastic manner as shown in Fig. 1 (b) . The channel loss t ( f ) is calculated independently. We use μ( f ) = E [ t ( f )] to denote the expected loss of channel f . We denote by f * = arg min f ∈K {μ( f )} as the best channel. If f = f * , we call it suboptimal channel. Similarly, the best strategy is defined as
, and we call others suboptimal strategies. For each channel f , we define the gap
, and let f = min f : ( f )>0 { ( f )} denote the minimal nonnegative gap of channels. Let N n ( f ) be the number of times channel f was played up to round n. Then, the regret defined in (7) can be rewritten and upper bounded by
Note that since the optimal strategy may contain suboptimal channels, the upper bound ofR (n) calculated from the perspective of the set N is looser than that from the whole spectrum pool K. In addition, |N | grows exponentially with respect to k, and different SA strategies may overlap extensively but are unexplored. Thus, we analyze the regret for each channel, where tighter regret bound can be achieved.
In this regime, all the user and environmental conditions are evolving by some stochastic patterns. We begin with an idealistic assumption that the gaps { ( f )} 1≤ f ∈K are known. This shows what the best result that the algorithm -ASPA can achieve. Then, we consider a more practical condition such that the gaps are unavailable before running the algorithm.
A new way of tuning the exploration parameters ξ n ( f ) is studied for practical implementation, which leads to a different regret performance from the previous subsection.
1) The Ideal Case: The results with the idealistic assumption is given in Theorem 3. The proof of Theorem 3 is based on the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Bernstein's Inequality for Martingales [23] ): Let X 1 , . . . , X m be martingale difference sequence with respect to filtration F = (F S i ) 1≤k≤m and let Y k = k j =1 X j be the associated martingale. Assume that there exist positive numbers ν and c, such that X j ≤ c for all j with probability 1 and
2 |F k−1 ≤ ν with probability 1.
Lemma 2: For any c > 0, we have
Lemma 3 can be proved by simple calculus. To obtain the tight regret bound for the -ASPA, we need to study and estimate the number of times each of channel is selected up to round n, i.e., N n ( f ). We summarize it in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3:
be non-increasing deterministic sequences, such that ε n ( f ) ≤ ε n ( f ) with probability 1 and
Then for any positive sequence b 1 , b 2 , . . . , and any n * ≥ 2 the number of times channel f is played by -ASPA up to round n is bounded as:
The proof is given in Appendix A. Theorem 3: Suppose that the gaps { ( f )} f ∈K are known. Let n * be the minimal integer that satisfy
. For any choice of η n = β n and any c ≥ 18, the regret of the -ASPA with
in the stochastic regime satisfies:
The proof is given in Appendix B.
From Theorem 3, we note that the leading constants k and K are optimal and tight as indicated in CombUCB1 [32] algorithm, which is better than the typical work [14] that studies general network problems. Moreover, comparing to the previous works [13] , [15] , [20] , [33] with the optimal regret bound O(log(n)), our algorithm only has a factor log(n). However, this is a trivial performance loss as we have proved in the numerical results in Section V. In addition, we get the great flexibility that -ASPA can be applied in many different regimes, while the algorithms in [13] , [15] , [20] , and [33] can only be used in the stochastic regime.
Corollary 3 presents the theoretical least expected EE in the stochastic regime.
Corollary 3: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of -ASPA in the stochastic regime is at least
where T = nt sp + nt a . With sufficiently large T , our -ASPA scheme of -ASPA is near optimal.
2) A Practical Case: In this case, the gaps { ( f )} f ∈K are unknown before running the algorithm. As such, the SU uses the empirical gap based on the collected cumulative loss of each channelL n ( f ) and the min f ∈K {L n ( f )} as the empirical best channel to estimate the true gap. The estimation process can be performed in background for each channel f that starts from the running of the -ASPA algorithm, i.e.,
Theorem 4: Set c ≥ 18 and η n = β n . Let n * be the minimal integer that satisfies n * ≥ 2 , termed as -ASPA AVG , in the stochastic regime satisfies:
Due to the space limitation, please refer to our technical report [34] for the proof details. From the above theorem, it is observed that in this case, there is another factor of log(n) that is worse than the idealistic case. The following corollary presents the guaranteed expected EE in the stochastic regime.
Corollary 4: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of -ASPA AVG in the stochastic regime under the oblivious jammer is at least
Obviously, the guaranteed least expected EE in Corollary 4 is slightly worse than the result in Corollary 3.
D. Contaminated Stochastic Regime
This regime captures a more practical situation, where only a few channels and time slots are attacked by the jammer, and the jammer leaves the system afterward. In this regime, an oblivious jammer may select some round-channel pairs (t, f ) as "locations" to attack, while the remaining channels evolve in the same way as in the stochastic regime. We define the attacking strength parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1/2). Specifically, after τ rounds, for t > τ, the total number of contaminated locations of each suboptimal channel up to round t is t ( f )ζ ( ( f ) < 1) . Similarly, the number of contaminated locations of the best channel channel is t f ζ ( f ≤ 1).
In our proof, we can show for all t > τ on the average over the stochasticity of the loss sequence the jammer can reduce the gap of every channel by at most one half. We show that the algorithm -ASPA AVG can still retain "polylogarithmic-n" regret, i.e., O log(n) 3 , in the contaminated stochastic regime with a potentially large leading constant in the performance. We call a contaminated stochastic regime moderately contaminated, if ζ is at most 1/4. The following is the result for the moderately contaminated stochastic regime.
Theorem 5: Under the setting of all parameters given in Theorem 2, for n * ( f ) = max{n * , e 4/ ( f ) 2 }, where n * is defined as before and n * 3 = max f ∈K n * ( f ), and the attacking strength parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1/4) the regret of the -ASPA in the contaminated stochastic regime that is contaminated after τ steps satisfies:
Due to the space limitation, please refer to our technical report [34] for the proof details. We define ζ ∈ [0, 1/4) to emulate the lightly contaminated regime, i.e., reduce the regret performance by at most one half. If ζ ∈ (1/4, 1/2), the leading factor 1/(1 − 2ζ ) will be very large. Then, the obtained regret bound is not quite meaningful, because we need much larger value of n * ( f ) to make the bound retain O log(n) 3 regret upper bound.
Corollary 5 presents the guaranteed least expected EE in the contaminated stochastic regime.
Corollary 5: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of -ASPA in the contaminated stochastic regime that is contaminated is at least
where T = nt sp + nt a . With sufficiently large T , our -ASPA scheme of the -ASPA is near optimal.
E. Further Discussions on the -ASPA Scheme
Besides the study of performance bounds in different regimes, we further discuss the following important issues on the sensing and probing phases. We start our discussion based on Corollary 1. By similar arguments, we have similar counterpart corollaries related to Theorems 2-5, which are omitted here for brevity.
1) Impact of Sensing Time: Usually, the false alarm probability of sensing affects the performance of ASPA scheme, which we do not analyze it yet. Since we consider energy detector for channel sensing, the false alarm probability is calculated by [24] 
is the decision threshold for sensing, f s is the channel bandwidth, and Q(·) is the Q-function for the tail probability of the standard normal distribution. Considering the false alarm probability, we have Corollary 6: The expected EE of -ASPA scheme of the -ASPA Algorithm is at least
The proof is straightforward as that of Corollary 1. For each round, each channel is sensed and probed successfully with probability 1 − P f a in expectation. Replacing T with (1− P f a )T , we get the above result. Here, P f a is a function of t s and α = t a t s +t p . Let t s be a control variable, we can compute the optimal t s , which maximizes the expected throughput by numerical analysis.
2) Impact of Probing Time and Others: Note that the step of probing is not necessary in our problem. The reason why the channel probing is necessary is that the SU could optimize power allocation by using the channel information especially when the channel condition varies wildly. Otherwise, if the channel qualities are always good enough, constant or randomly generated transmit power could be adopted on each channel, and then a better EE since there is no probing overhead.
Our -ASPA scheme can also be extended to a simplified -ASA (omitted 'p') scheme without the probing step, in which the SU only observes the transmit rate after each successful transmission to calculate the EE. Thus, after n rounds, n expected transmissions will be observed by using -ASA scheme. Hence, we can show that the expected throughput of -ASA scheme is
where α = t a t s . Let t * p be the probing time which satisfies
. When t p ≤ t * p , we will use -ASPA; otherwise, we use -ASA.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR MULTIPLE USERS A. Implementation of -ASPA With Multiple SUs
Notice that the -ASPA algorithm could be implemented for multiple SUs, where their observations of the best multi-channel access strategies are quite similar if each channel is identical across the SUs. However, an awkward situation may happen that all the users access the same channels, which results in low efficiencies. To resolve this issue, we apply the TDFS scheme [20] by introducing round-robin schemes among SUs. We implement this idea in our experiments, where there are m SUs equipped with the same algorithm using a single common control channel (CCC) to communicate, coordinate the transmission, and share the cumulative values of EEs on the CCC. Sharing this information would speed up exploration of the accumulated historic information. We name this scheme as cooperative learning among SUs. We leave the detailed theoretical analysis in future works due to space limit.
B. Simulation Results
We evaluate the performance of the -ASPA on a CR system which contains 16 USRP devices for CR nodes (SUs) and 8 USRP devices as the primacy users (PUs). There is a lineof-sight link between the two nodes at a specific distance, which varies for different experiments from 10 meters to 60 meters with fixed topology. We conduct all our experiments on our own built system. The maximum transmit rate for each sensor node ranges from 20 bps to 240 kbps. The number of total channels K varies from 4 to 64 that are available for each PU in primary communication (PC), where all the 8 PUs share these channels. The transmission bandwidth of PUs are 4 MHz, while the bandwidth of each USRP is 350 kHz with 4 ASPA radios (and channels). The channel sensing and probing models are activated for SUs in the USRP devices. The RF performance of a single channel is operating at 3.5 GHz with the received noise less than 8 dBm, and the the maximum output power of each USRP device is 11.5 dBm. The average transmit power is about 8.63 dBm. Here, we only count the average measured circuit and processing power that is related to data transmission, which is about 36.7 dBm. We set the total power budget P total of each SU to be 9.24 dBm.
We assume that all SUs agree upon a CCC, where the channel 17 is used as the CCC. We take = 1 to get the maximum achievable EE. The PUs are fixed in locations. We assume that the PUs adopt the on-and-off model for all the suboptimal channels to conduct the PC, where the model follows a Bernoulli random variable with bias 0.5. We set a single best channel (by implicitly assuming all channels have the similar distributions before the run) for the PC, where its on-and-off model is Bernoulli with bias 0.7.
There are four different types of datasets to emulate the following typical regimes of the wireless environments: 1) the measured EE of each channel without any jamming or interruption, where the distributions of link states are benign; 2) the measured EE under contaminated channel quality at some rounds indicated in Fig. 3 , where other sensor nodes are introduced to interrupt the communications; 3) the measured EE under adversarial channel qualities by the same type of USRP nodes working under the same parameter configurations to send random interfering power during the run of the algorithm (oblivious) on all channels (adversarial regime); 4) the measured EE of each channel under θ -memory jammer with the same set of algorithms implemented for CR nodes. W.L.O.G., we normalize the EE into unitary value in every round t. Then, we set k = 4 and the total number of channels K = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64. To show the advantages of our -ASPA algorithms, we also implement the other existing and related MAB based algorithms with the same objective functions, and compare the performance of ours with them. These algorithms include:
• The combinatorial version of the non-stochastic MABs in CR communications [8] , i.e., " -SPA"; • The combinatorial stochastic MAB, i.e., "CombUCB1", with the tight regret bound as proved in [32] , which is a representative realization of the stochastic MAB algorithms in [13] , [15] , [20] , and [33] ; • The multiple SUs cooperative learning versions of algorithms of ours and others above. In Fig. 3-5 , the solid lines represent the mean performance over the experiments, and the dashed lines represent the mean plus on standard deviation (std) over the ten repetitions of the corresponding experiments. For a given optimal channel access strategy, a small regret value indicates a large value of EE. We set all versions of our -ASPA algorithms parameterized by
is the empirical estimate of t ( f ), and parameters η t and δ t according to the theorems.
In the first group of experiments in the stochastic regime as shown in Fig. 2 , it is easy to see that -ASPA enjoys almost the same (cumulative) regrets as CombUCB1, and has a much lower regret over time than the adversarial -SPA. It is also observed that there is a significantly regrets reduction when cooperative learning (m = 6, 16) is employed for both -ASPA and CombUCB1. This result indicates that -ASPA is capable of achieving the optimal learning performance in the stochastic user and environmental conditions in an adaptive way. This verifies the result shown in Theorems 3-4. Also, the adversarial -SPA performs not well in the stochastic regime. Our second group of experiments are in the moderately contaminated stochastic environment. There are several contaminated rounds as labeled in Fig. 3 , which is made by the irregular jamming at these rounds. So the contamination does not make the whole dataset fully adversarial. Despite the corrupted rounds, the -ASPA algorithm "reacts to the jammed slots" and "successfully returns" (from rounds around 2 * 10 5 to 3 * 10 5 ) to the stochastic operation mode. And, it finally achieves better results than that of -SPA. It also has comparable performance as CombUCB1. Note that, all other algorithms are either incapable to detect the "contaminated points" or result in bad performance. We also find that the cooperative learning among m SUs is highly efficient in performance improvements for all algorithms.
We conduct the third group of experiments in the adversarial regime. We present the oblivious jammer case in Fig. 4 . Due to the strong interference effect on each channel and the arbitrarily changing jamming behaviors, all algorithms experience very high accumulated regrets. It can be found that our -ASPA algorithm has close and slightly worst learning performance compared to -SPA, which confirms our theoretical analysis. Note that we do not implement stochastic MAB algorithms such as CombUCB1, since it is not applicable in this regime. This shows that the -ASPA has the ability to automatically detect the environment, and can be applied in the situation that the stochastic MAB algorithms [15] , [20] , [33] can not.
In our fourth set of experiments shown in Fig. 5 , we simulate the adaptive jamming attack case in the adversarial regime with a typical large memory = 20. It is observed that there are huge performance degradations for all algorithms when compared to the oblivious jammer case. The multiplicative effect of makes the -ASPA and -SPA very hard to combat this type of jamming attack, although the regret curves under -ASPA and -SPA are still sublinear (no-regret) after normalization.
We also compare the average EE loss per channel of the -ASPA (after a run of 10 7 rounds) with respect to the optimal solution for 100 random channel realizations with a path-loss exponent of 3, a noise figure of 7dB, a carrier frequency of 3.5 GHz, a noise bandwidth of 10 MHz, and the average circuit power P c t ( f ) = 29.2 dBm for each transmitting channel f . The result is shown in Fig. 6 . As the number of available channels increases, the EE loss decreases. This confirms the well-known "multi-channel" diversity in wireless communications. In addition, increasing m also reduces the average loss of EE.
Moreover, we conduct another group of experiments to verify the performance of our algorithms in the fading environments. We consider the Rician fading has a direct-toscattered signal path ratio ofK = 6 dB, which is expected to dominate mobile communications. In Fig. 7 , it shows the gaps between ours and optimal EE solutions, where we observe similar phenomena but with a larger variance when compared with the result in Fig. 6 . Nevertheless, the results in Fig. 7 are reasonable for this typical condition. It can be shown that the methodology presented in this paper can be applied to find the power allocation for any channel distribution.
In our next group of experiments, we compare the measured EE (kb/J) for all the four different regimes under different number of K after a relative long period of learning rounds n = 4 * 10 7 . We plot our results in Fig. 8 . It is easy to find that our algorithm -ASPA attains almost all the advantages of the stochastic MAB algorithms CombUCB1, and has better EE performance than -SPA. In Fig. 8 , it shows that our algorithm -ASPA could be feasible in different regimes and achieve the near optimal EE performance. Note that the stochastic MAB algorithm CombUCB1 [32] is not applicable in both the adversarial regime and the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime. In addition, the -SPA achieves low EE in most regimes than that of ours.
We further consider the practical mixed adversarial and stochastic regime as a typical network security scenario for fair comparison in the middle bottom of Fig. 8 , where only parts of the channels are under attack in the wireless security environment. Comparing the EE of our -ASPA to that of the classic algorithm -SPA, we observe that an average improvement of 45.3% with different size of channel sets K = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 under oblivious jamming attack, and an improvement of 87.4% under adaptive jamming attack. Moreover, to reach the same value of EE (i.e., 120 kb/J) by the -ASPA algorithm, the -SPA takes a total of n = 7.315 * 10 7 learning rounds. This indicates an improvement of 82.5% in the learning period for our proposed -ASPA algorithm.
In the last group of experiments, we test the EE performance under our OSGD-based power allocation scheme OSGD and the other two non-adaptive power control schemes in the contaminated stochastic regime. The first non-adaptive power control scheme is by randomly selecting a power strategy from set P f (Random), and the other one is by selecting an average power value over all channels with per-channel power constraint P f and the mask of the total power constraint P total (Average). We list all the results of EE in Table I under different K = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64. We could image the different power allocation schemes as ways of different (anti-)jamming effect imposed on the channel, so does their effects on the reward g t (P t ( f )) on the channel f . Our channel selection procedure in -ASPA only reacts to the resulted reward for each channel (and SA strategy). To this end, comparing to both of the schemes and by a simple calculation, the adaptive power control scheme has an EE improvement to 169.73% when compared with the Random scheme in the average sense over all scenarios, and has an EE improvement to 122.25% when compared with the Average scheme in the average sense over all scenarios. This proves that our proposed online adaptive power allocation is a very promising technique in the jammingresistant EE CR communications.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an adaptive and practical jamming-resistant -ASPA algorithm for CRs. We categorized the features of the security environments into three typical regimes, and provided near-optimal regret performance for each of them. A novel OSGD-based power allocation scheme with bandit feedback is devised. Extensive experiments were conducted, which demonstrate the proposed jamming-resistant algorithm enjoying excellent scalability and could be implemented efficiently in practical secure CR communications.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Note that the elements of the martingale difference sequence { ( f ) − (˜ n ( f ) −˜ n ( f * ))} ∞ n=1 by max{ ( f ) +˜ n ( f * )} = ε n ( f * ) . We further note that
